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COMMENTS
Capital Punishment in North Carolina: The 1977 Death
Penalty Statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court
Although no one has been executed in North Carolina for twenty years,1
capital punishment remains a permissible penalty under state law.2 The North
Carolina capital punishment statute3 enacted in 1977,4 provides for a bifur-
cated trial and sentence procedure. Upon conviction of a capital offense a
defendant is given a separate hearing before the jury to determine whether he
is to be punished by death or by life imprisonment.5 At the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing, the jury must decide whether one or more "aggravating
circumstances" are "sufficiently substantial" to call for the imposition of the
death penalty. The jury must also determine whether any "mitigating circum-
stances" exist and whether the mitigating circumstances are sufficient to out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances. Based on this analysis, the jury is asked
to reach a unanimous sentence recommendation of death or life imprison-
ment.
6
The current North Carolina statute became effective June 1, 1977.7 It has
1. The last execution in North Carolina occurred in 1961. See Patrick, Capital Punishment
and L!fe Imprisonment in North Carolina, 1946 to 1968: Implication for Abolition of the Death
Penalty, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 417, 418 (1970).
2. The only crime punishable by death in North Carolina is first degree murder. Murder in
the first degree is a murder committed with premediation and deliberation, or a murder commit-
ted in perpetration of a felony. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1979). Apparently in the wake of
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), one
may conclude that the eighth amendment prohibits punishment by death upon conviction for
rape.
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000-2003 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
4. Law of May 19, 1977, Ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 407.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (1978).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
7. Law of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 9, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, Ist Sess. 411. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court was called upon to decide the expostfacto effect of the new statute in State v.
Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979). In Detter, the murderous acts-poisonings-were
committed between January and March 1977. The victim did not die until June 9, 1977-after the
effective date of the current capital punishment statute. Prior to the effective date of the statute,
the maximum penalty for first degree murder was life imprisonment because the previous North
Carolina death penalty -tatute had been struck down by the United States Supreme Court.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The defendant was tried and convicted of first
degree murder, and received a sentencing hearing under the 1977 statute. She appealed the result-
ing death sentence on the ground that the capital punishment statute could not apply to acts
committed before its effective date.
The supreme court agreed, holding that the time at which a murder by poisoning is deemed
to have been committed for purposes of analyzing the expostfacto effect of a new statute is the
time at which the murderous act is committed and not the time of death of the victim. Because the
poisonings occurred between the decision in Woodson and the effective date of the new statute, the
supreme court vacated the death sentence and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment
imposing life imprisonment. The court's order on remand was based on section 6 of the capital
punishment statute, which provides that if a death sentence is declared to be unconstitutional for
any reason the punishment on conviction is life imprisonment. Law of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 6,
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws, 1st Sess. 411.
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been the subject of a flurry of cases in the North Carolina Supreme Court.8 In
all but one of the recent cases the court found error below and remanded for
further proceedings. In a single case, however, the court determined that the
capital punishment statute was properly applied by the trial court. The court
then considered the statute in light of the eighth and fourteenth amendments
and held that it passed constitutional scrutiny, thus affirming a sentence of
death.9
The present North Carolina capital punishment statute is a result of the
line of death penalty cases in the United States Supreme Court, beginning
with Furman v. Georgia 10 in 1972. There it was decided that traditional sen-
tencing methods in death cases produced arbitrary and random results-so
arbitrary and random as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 1 The
Fuiman decision was followed in North Carolina by State v. Waddell,12 in
which Furman was interpreted as prohibiting capital punishment only where
its infliction is at the discretion ofjudge or jury. The North Carolina Supreme
Court accordingly invalidated the discretionary provisions of the death pen-
alty statute and severed them from the remainder, leaving death as the
mandatory punishment for capital crimes. This decision was confirmed by the
General Assembly in 1974, when the murder, rape, burglary and arson statutes
were rewritten to make death the mandatory sentence for the crimes of first
degree murder and first degree rape and life imprisonment the mandatory
penalty for first degree burglary and arson.13 The 1974 legislation was fol-
lowed by State v. Woodson 14 in which the mandatory death penalty was up-
8. All sentences of death are subject to automatic review by the supreme court for errors
assigned on appeal and for consideration of the punishment imposed. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(d)(1) (1978).
9. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
11. The pivotal opinions in the 5-4 decision proved to be those of Justices Stewart and White.
Justice Stewart found that unbridled jury discretion in sentencing produced sentences that are
"'cruel' in the sense that they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments
that the state legislatures have determined to be necessary. . . .[and] 'unusual' in the sense that
the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and that its imposition for rape is ex-
traordinarily rare." 408 U.S. at 309. Justice Stewart concluded that there was no discernible basis
for distinguishing those who are sentenced to death from those who commit similar crimes but
suffer less extreme punishment, and declared that the "Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments can-
not tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique pen-
alty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id at 310.
Justice White felt that the death penalty would become unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
when its imposition ceased to further the social ends that it was traditionally considered to serve.
Under the former system of unbridled jury discretion in sentencing, Justice White concluded that
"the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution in too attenuated to be of
substantial service to criminal justice," thus eliminating the constitutional justification for its exist-
ence. 408 U.S. at 313.
12. 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973). The historical background of the current North
Carolina Capital Punishment Statute is recounted in State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 56-63, 257
S.E.2d 597, 606-610 (1979).
13. Law of April 8, 1974, ch. 1201, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 323 (rewriting N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 14-17 (first degree murder), 14-21 (rape), 14-52 (first degree burglary) and 14-58 (arson))
(the Legislature repealed § 14-21 by the Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 682, § 7, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws,
1st Sess. 725).
14. 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975) rev'd, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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held against constitutional challenge by a unanimous state supreme court.
The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected the mandatory death
penalty as a permissible response to Furman in Woodson v. North Carolina.5
There the plurality of Justices reasoned that mandatory death sentences would
-not eliminate the problems engendered by jury discretion in sentencing, be-
cause juries would nullify the mandatory sentence by refusing to convict. 16
The plurality also felt that the mandatory death penalty for first degree mur-
der departed from "contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the
punishment of death and thus [could not] be applied consistently with the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State's power to
punish 'be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.' "17 Finally, the
plurality held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sen-
tencing body consider "relevant aspects of the character and record of each
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death."' 8
The 1974 North Carolina legislation thus fell short of constitutional adequacy
in three respects: a continued potential for unbridled jury discretion; a conflict
with "evolving societal standards of decency" in imposing punishment; and a
failure to address the particular circumstances of the individual defendant.
The legislative response to the constitutional defects of the 1974 legisla-
tion was recourse to a capital punishment system that had survived the
Supreme Court's scrutiny in the three companion cases of Woodson: the
"guided discretion" system based on the Model Penal Code. 19 In Gregg v.
Georgia,20 Proffitt v. Florida2l and Jurek v. Texas,22 the court held that a bi-
furcated system of guilt determination and sentence determination that per-
mits the sentencing authority to consider facts and circumstances of the
particular crime and the particular defendant before imposing sentence does
not violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
It is this "guided discretion" system that is at the core of the current North
Carolina statute. The methods it prescribes for focusing the sentencing au-
thority's attention on the presence or absence of enumerated aggravating or
mitigating factors addresses the problems discerned by the Supreme Court in
both the unbridled discretion and mandatory sentencing systems.23 The sen-
tencing authority, which in North Carolina is the same jury that sat at the guilt
determination phase,24 is required to examine a list of aggravating and miti-
15. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
16. Id at 302-03.
17. Id at 301.
18. Id at 303.
19. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.0-.6 (Official Draft 1962).
20. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
21. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
22. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
23. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1977-Criminal Procedure, 56 N.C.
L. REv. 843, 1027-1030 (1978).
24. If a defendant pleads guilty to a capital felony he is entitled to a sentencing hearing
before a jury selected for that purpose. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2).
The exclusion of potential jurors who have expressed unequivocal opposition to the death
penalty and who would refuse to recommend its infliction regardless of the evidence has been
1981]
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gating factors25 supplied to them by the judge.26 The jury's decision is to be
based on the presence or absence of these factors. Thus, the decision as to the
sentence is reached by a similar reasoning process in each case, based on legis-
lative judgments as to the significance of the enumerated factors to the proper
sentence. This "guidance" of the sentence's decision addresses the problem of
capriciousness arising in Furman. The jury is also given flexibility in reaching
its sentencing decision, however, since it is the jurors who must weigh and
balance the relative and cumulative significance of the enumerated factors,
both of the crime and of the defendant. This "discretion" addresses the
"evolving standards of decency" and "personal characteristics" requirements
of Woodson.
A separate sentencing proceeding must be held "[u]pon conviction or ad-
judication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony."27 Given this statutory
mandate, it is necessary to determine the circumstances under which a sen-
tencing hearing is required to be held, the body before which it is to be held,
the evidence and arguments that may be presented, the allocation of the bur-
den of proof on the various issues, and the results of the proceeding when a
decision is reached or when there is no decision. A rapidly growing body of
case law in the North Carolina Supreme Court examines these issues.
I. THE SENTENCING HEARING: WHEN MUST IT BE HELD?
The statutory sentencing procedure is mandatory, and must be held
whenever a defendant is convicted or adjudged guilty of a capital felony.28
The trial judge has no discretion with regard to the sentencing hearing. In
State v. Jones29 the Supreme Court on its own motion reviewed a sentence of
life imprisonment entered pursuant to a pretrial consent order after the jury
returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree murder. The court
stated that G.S. 15A-2000(a)(1) requires that a sentencing proceeding be held
whenever a judgment of guilty of a capital felony is entered. The state is not
permitted to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment when there is evi-
dence from which a jury could find at least one aggravating circumstance.
Regardless of the state's intention not to seek the death penalty, the sentencing
proceeding must be held and the decision as to punishment must be placed in
the hands of the jury.30
permitted by the United States Supreme Court. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The
Witherspoon problem has arisen in several of the recent North Carolina cases. See text at notes
42-59 ifra.
25. See text at notes 80-81 Myfra.
26. In the instructions to the jury before it begins deliberations on the sentence the judge
must instruct the jury that it must consider any of the enumerated aggravating or mitigatin cir-
cumstances that are supported by the evidence. The jury must be supplied with a written list of
issues relating to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b)
(1978).
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (1978).
28. The only capital felony in North Carolina is first degree murder. See note 2, supra.
29. 299 N.C. 298, 261 S.E.2d 860 (1980).
30. The court in State v. Jones held that despite the error in sentencing considerations of
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A similar issue was resolved to the same effect in State v. Johnson (John-
son I). 3 1 There defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree murder.
The court refused to approve the plea as part of a bargain in exchange for the
state's recommendation of life imprisonment. After being advised of his rights
to jury trial and instructed as to the effect of a plea of guilty, defendant per-
sisted in his desire to plead guilty notwithstanding the possibility of a death
sentence.32 A jury was convened for the sentencing proceeding and recom-
mended the death penalty.33 In review, the supreme court expressly approved
the trial judge's rejection of the negotiated plea of guilty. Writing for the
court, Justice Exum noted that the statute does not expressly prohibit such an
arrangement, but decided that the legislature did not intend that a defendant
found guilty of a capital felony should receive a sentence of life imprisonment
without the intervention of a jury.34 Furthermore, held the court, the statute
does not permit the state to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment to the
jury at the sentencing hearing if there is evidence from which the jury could
find at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. 35 The rationale
for removing the temptation for a defendant to negotiate a plea of guilty in
return for a recommendation for life imprisonment is to avoid placing a con-
stitutionally impermissible burden upon the right of a defendant to trial by
jury. The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Jackson36 that
a criminal statute cannot encourage a defendant to waive his right to plead not
guilty by foreclosing the possibility of a death sentence that would arise if the
defendant proceeded to trial.37 The defendant must therefore face the same
potential range of punishment upon pleading guilty as he would face upon
being found guilty at trial. This rule has been interpreted by the North Caro-
lina court as precluding negotiated pleas of guilty in return for which the state
double jeopardy precluded a retrial, and that because the error was favorable to the defendant, the
sentence would not be disturbed. 299 N.C. at 308-09, 261 S.E.2d at 867.
31. 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979). (A second case involving the same defendant but a
different crime is reported at 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979), and will be referred to as
Johnson II. There defendant's proffered plea of guilty to the charge of first degree murder in
exchange for a life sentence was rejected by the trial court. 298 N.C. at 360-61, S.E.2d at 756-57).
32. Such pleas are expressly authorized by the statute. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2001 (1978).
Before the enactment of this statute, pleas of guilty to charges for which the punishment might be
death were not permitted. See State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 17, 194 S.E.2d 800, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1000 (1973). Defendant's plea of guilty was accepted in Johnson I only after questioning of
the defendant, a hearing, and factual findings of the basis of the plea. 298 N.C. at 52 & n.6, 257
S.E.2d at 603 & n.6.
33. 298 N.C. at 56, 257 S.E.2d at 605.
34. Id at 78, 257 S.E.2d at 619.
35. Id
36. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
37. Under former G.S. 15-162.1 (repealed 1971), a defendant, with the approval of the court
and the district attorney, could plead guilty to a capital charge and receive a sentence of life
imprisonment. Law of April 2, 1953, ch. 616, §§ 1-2, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws, 461. Relying in Jack-
son, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held the North Carolina statute unconstitutional in
Afford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340 (1968) rev'd on other grounds, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). After
Aford, the statute was repealed in 1969. Law of March 25, 1969, ch. 117, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess.
Laws, 104. The statute was re-enacted and again repealed in 1971. Law of June 15, 1971, ch. 562,
§ 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws, 497 (re-enacting statute); Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1225, § 1, 1971 N.C.
Sess. Laws, 1788 (repealing statute).
19811
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offers a recommendation of life imprisonment either to the trial judge or to the
jury at the sentencing proceeding as long as there is evidence of at least one
aggravating circumstance. Where the state has no such evidence, a sentencing
hearing must nevertheless be convened, but the state may announce its lack of
evidence of aggravating circumstances and the court may enter a sentence of
life imprisonment without submitting the case to the jury for a sentence rec-
ommendation.38
The holding in Johnson I that the North Carolina statute prohibits argu-
ments by the state against imposition of the death penalty is based on the
omission from the North Carolina statute of language that appears in the
Model Penal Code version relating to negotiated pleas of guilty.39 It is unclear
why the omission of this language should prompt the court to reject arguments
against imposition of the death penalty by the state, but the reference in John-
son I is explicit.40 The apparent rationale for the holding is that the court is
unwilling to interpret the statute so as to take the sentencing decision out of
the hands of the jury in any case in which death sentence is a possibility. The
jury is to be the arbiter of punishment, and as such should hear arguments
both for and against imposition of the death penalty. The district attorney is
thus required to advocate use of the death penalty in every case in which it
could be imposed, regardless of the beliefs of the individual attorney or the
merits of the particular case.41
Taken together, Jones and Johnson I make it clear that the statutory pro-
cedure for sentencing is absolutely required in every case in which death is a
permissible penalty. The sentencing procedure may be cut short where the
state has no evidence of aggravating circumstances, but in any event the sen-
tencing proceeding must be initiated and concluded before a sentence of death
or life imprisonment may be imposed.
II. COMPOSITION OF THE JURY
The composition of the body before whom the guilt determination phase
and sentencing hearing is to be held has been at issue in a number of recent
North Carolina cases. Under principles in Witherspoon v. Illinois42 a criminal
defendant has a right to a trial before a jury that represents a fair cross-section
of the community with regard to attitudes concerning capital punishment. Ve-
niremen may not be excluded from serving as jurors in a capital case merely
38. Johnson 1, 298 N.C. at 79-80, 257 S.E.2d at 620.
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This section permits
the court to sentence the defendant for a felony of the first degree (imprisonment for a term up to
life imprisonment) if the court is satisfied that "the defendant with the consent of the prosecuting
attorney and the approval of the Court, pleaded guilty to murder as a felony of the first degree."
40. 298 N.C. at 79, 257 S.E.2d at 619-20.
41. The problems associated with negotiated pleas to capital charges do not arise when the
plea is to a lesser included offense of the capital crime. Thus plea bargaining stategy shifts its
focus from the issue of sentence to the issue of the offense to which the plea will be offered. In
North Carolina this will usually be second degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 298 N.C.
380, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979).
42. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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because they express "general objections to the death penalty or ... conscien-
tious or religious scruples against its infliction." 43 However, potential jurors
may be excluded if they make it "unmistakeably clear (1) that they would
automaticaly vote against the imposition of capital punishment without re-
gard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before
them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt."44 The Wither-
spoon case addressed the Illinois jury's role as the arbiter both of guilt and of
punishment in a single proceeding. Where, as in North Carolina under the
present statute, two separate proceedings are held, the exclusion of jurors from
the guilt determination phase for reasons relevant only to the role of jurors in
the sentencing phase casts the Witherspoon problem in a new light.
Nevertheless, the North Carolina court has retained the Witherspoon test
for excusing veniremen from service at the guilt determination phase. In State
v. Cherry,45 the trial court excused twenty-one potential jurors who indicated
that they could not recommend imposition of the death penalty under any
circumstances and would automatically vote against its use without regard to
the evidence presented at trial. Rejecting defendant's assignment of error on
this issue, the supreme court held that the capital punishment statute requires
use of the same jury at both phases of the proceeding "unless the original jury
is 'unable to reconvene.' "46 Thus a defendant is not ordinarily entitled to
separate juries at each phase of the trial, and the jurors selected must be quali-
fied to serve at both the guilt determination and sentencing phases. The court
bolstered its interpretation of the statute by reference to United States
Supreme Court cases in which the same jury heard both phases of the trial.47
The court also stated that the Witherspoon test permits excusal for cause of
veniremen whose "attitudes toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt."'4 8
In the aftermath of Cherry the North Carolina court has maintained the
position that a potential juror's personal attitudes toward the death penalty
may be sufficient grounds for his excusal from service at the guilt determina-
tion phase of a trial, since the same jury must be qualified to hear both the
guilt and sentencing phases.49 A venireman may be excused for cause when-
ever his statements on voir dire show an unequivocal opposition to imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of proof of aggravating circumstances. 50 The
43. 391 U.S. at 522.
44. Id at 522-23, n.21 (emphasis in original).
45. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979).
46. 298 N.C. at 106, 257 S.E. at 563-64. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1978).
47. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), cited at 298
N.C. 105-06, 257 S.E.2d 563).
48. 298 N.C. at 106, 257 S.E.2d at 563 (emphasis in original).
49. State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980); State v. Boykin, 298 N.C. 687, 259
S.E.2d 883 (1979); State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979); State v. Johnson (Johnson
II), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979);
State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 257 S.E.2d 391 (1979).
50. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 324-25, 259 S.E.2d 510, 526-27 (1979). Where a potentialjuror's response to questioning is contradictory or equivocal, the trial court apparently can excuse
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court has rejected arguments that a Witherspoon-qualified jury is unfairly
weighted against the defendant on the issue of guilt 5' and that the removal of
jurors personally opposed to imposition of the death penalty unconstitution-
ally deprives a defendant to a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the
community.5 2 In so doing the North Carolina court professed its compliance
with rules set by the United States Supreme Court.
53
On the latter issue of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury
composed of a fair cross-section of the community,54 the North Carolina court
has extended the Witherspoon rule beyond its previous boundaries. In State v.
Avery the court's rejection of the contention that the exclusion of opponents of
capital punishment from service as jurors at the guilt determination phase vio-
lates defendant's sixth amendment rights was based on a brief passage in
Lockett v. Ohio.55 There the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment
does not encompass "the right to be tried by jurors who have explicitly indi-
cated an inability to follow the law and instructions of the trial judge. '5 6 In
Avery, Justice Exum's strong dissent57 recited evidence tending to show that
persons strongly opposed to capital punishment, as a group, entertain attitudes
significantly different in a number of respects from those of persons who favor
use of the death penalty.58 The systematic exclusion of this group, said Justice
Exum, tends to remove this segment of community attitudes from juries in
death cases.5 9 However, even systematic exclusion of identifiable groups is
him for cause if his statements, "considered contextually," show that regardless of the evidence he
would not vote to impose the death penalty. Id at 324, 259 S.E.2d at 526 (citing State v. Bernard,
288 N.C. 321, 218 S.E.2d 327 (1975)). State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 137-38, 261 S.E.2d 803, 810(1980); ajuror whose statements about the death penalty do not evidence such a position may not
be excused for cause. State v. Johnson (Johnson Ii), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979). The
erroneous exclusion of even a single venireman for Witherspoon reasons is an error of sufficient
magnitude to render a resulting death sentence invalid. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976)
(per curiam).
51. State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 413-14, 259 S.E.2d 502, 507 (1979). State v. Spaulding, 298
N.C. 149, 160-61, 257 S.E.2d 391, 398-99 (1979).
52. State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 133-35, 261 S.E.2d 803, 808-09 (1980).
53. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968) (no evidence that exclusion ofjurors
opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-976 (1978) (defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury composed of a
fair cross-section of the community does not mandate the inclusion of groups who express an
inability to discharge their duty as jurors to follow the law).
54. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
55. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
56. Id at 596-97.
57. This is one of only two instances of disagreement on the North Carolina court in the
many recent cases applying the 1977 capital punishment statute. The other is a dissent in part by
Justice Exum in Johnson I.
58. 299 N.C. at 143-44, 261 S.E.2d at 813-14.
59. The Witherspoon test also tends to underrepresent blacks on juries. Justice Exum cites a
1971 Harris poll indicating that whereas twenty-one percent of white potential jurors are disquali-
fied by the Witherspoon rule, thirty-five percent of black veniremen are excluded. 299 N.C. at 145,
261 S.E.2d at 814. See White, The ConsitutionalInvalidity of Convictions imposedby.Death-Quall.fled Jurors, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1176, 1194 (1973).
Defendant in Avery also argued that the WPitherspoon test produces prosecution-prone juries,
and presented data confirming their conclusion. The court rejected the contention. 299 N.C. at
138, 261 S.E.2d at 810. Justice Exum, while not reaching the merits of the argument, commended
it to the General Assembly for its consideration. 299 N.C. at 147, 261 S.E.2d at 816.
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permissible if a significant state interest is advanced by the aspects of the jury
selection process that result in the exclusion. 60 Previous cases indicate that
exclusion of jurors whose feelings about the death penalty would prevent them
from reaching an objective decision as to the defendant's guilt is permissible,
based on the state interest in seating jurors who are willing to follow the law.6'
It does not follow, however, that the state can continue to challenge jurors for
cause at the guilt stage of the trial when their attitudes about the death penalty
would prevent them from voting for its imposition, but would not affect their
ability to judge the defendant's guilt or innocence now that these two functions
are procedurally separated. For this reason Justice Exum dissented from the
majority holding that defendant inAvery was not denied a jury composed of a
fair cross-section of the community.62
Given the force of this logic and the existence of numerous studies not
available to the Supreme Court in 1968 when Witherspoon was decided,63 the
continued validity of the rule in states using a bifurcated trial such as North
Carolina should be seriously questioned.64 The obvious defect in continued
use of the Witherspoon rule could be easily cured by seating otherwise quali-
fied opponents of capital punishment at the guilt determination phase and re-
placing them with previously selected alternates (or, if need be, with an entire
panel) at the sentencing phase. Although the North Carolina statute contem-
plates use of the guilt phase jury at the sentencing phase,65 the statute does
make allowance for the seating of alternates at the sentencing hearing "[i]f
prior to the time that the trial jury begins its deliberations on the issue of
penalty, any juror dies, becomes incapacitated or disqualified, or is discharged
for any reason." 66 The delay between the conclusion of the guilt phase and
the initiation of the sentencing phase should be minimal, since a sufficient
number of Witherspoon -qualified alternates would be selected along with the
original panel at the beginning of the trial.
The breakup of the North Carolina court's unanimity in death penalty
cases on this issue67 may signal a willingness to address the problem more
analytically in a future case." 68 If, however, the court declines to reconsider
60. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 367-68 (1979).
61. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 567, 596-97 (1978).
62. 299 N.C. at 149, 261 S.E.2d at 817.
63. See, e.g., sources cited by Justice Exum in Avery, 299 N.C. at 144, 261 S.E.2d at 814,
nn.5-1 1.
64. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the Witherspoon doctrine to the bifurcated cap-
ital trial procedure of Texas. See Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980). The Court ob-
served that "Itlhe State does not violate the Witherspoon doctrine when it excludes prospective
jurors who are unable or unwilling to address the penalty question with this degree of impartial-
ity." Id. at 2526.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1978).
66. Id
67. See note 54, supra.
68. The court in very was not faced with the prospect of affirming a death sentence, because
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous sentence recommendation, and the trial judge therefore
imposed a life sentence pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000(b). The supreme court, per Brock, J., had the
following comment: "From the evidence before the court this defendant committed a planned,
deliberate and vicious killing of an innocent human being merely for the purpose of robbery to
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its holding in Avery, and adopt Justice Exum's position, the legislature should
overruleAvery by amending the capital punishment statute. Until either event
occurs, the clear import of the recent North Carolina cases is that the same
jury that sits at the guilt determination phase must also hear the sentencing
phase, and each member of the panel must be qualified to serve at both pro-
ceedings.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES IN AGGRAVATION OR MITIGATION OF SENTENCE
Once it has been determined that a sentencing hearing must be held and
the body before whom it is to be held is selected, the court should proceed to
conduct the hearing "as soon as practicable after the guilty verdict is re-
turned."69 The jury may receive evidence either from the state or the defend-
ant, but unless a new jury is empaneled at the sentencing hearing, evidence
presented at the guilt determination phase need not be resubmitted.70 All evi-
dence received at the guilt determination phase may be considered by the jury
in determining its sentence recommendation.71 Additional evidence presented
at the sentencing hearing must be relevant to the sentence. The statute pro-
vides that "[a]ny evidence which the court deems to have probative value may
be received."72 While this language might be interpreted as suspending the
usual rules of evidence at the sentencing hearing, this is not the case. In State
v. Cherry73 the supreme court stated that "[t]he language of this statute does
not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial judge's power to rule on
the admisslbiiity of evidence."74 In this respect, the North Carolina statute
differs from the Model Penal Code version, under which any unprivileged evi-
dence deemed by the court to have probative force may be received regardless
of its admissibility.75 Under the holding in Cherry, North Carolina law may
be in conflict with Green v. Georgia,76 in which the Supreme Court held in an
8-I division that exclusion of testimony by the hearsay rule violates due pro-
cess when the testimony is highly relevant to a critical issue in the sentencing
phase of the trial and there are substantial reasons to assume its reliability.77
satisfy his personal desire for a little money. He is fortunate that the jury was unable to agree on
the death penalty." 299 N.C. at 139, 261 S.E.2d at 811.
For a discussion of the effects of the death-qualification process, and the response of other
courts to issues raised in.Avery, see Comment, Proposals to Balance Interests of the Defendant and
State in the Selection of CapitalJuries: A Witherspoon Qualocation, 59 N.C.L. REv. 767 (1981).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1978).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1978).
71. Id
72. Id
73. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979).
74. Id at 98, 257 S.E.2d at 559 (emphasis in original).
75. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
76. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 97. Petitioner in Green had sought to introduce hearsay testimony to prove that he
was not present when the shooting of the murder victim occurred. The statement was made by a
codefendant who was tried separately, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder. The
reliability of the statement, said the court, could be judged by corroboratin, evidence, its incom-
patibility with declarant's penal interest, and its use by the state at declarant s trial. (Under Geor-
gia law, a confession to a crime is not hearsay when offered against declarant. Id. at 97 & n.3).
[Vol. 59
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Thus, at least with regard to proof of mitigating circumstances, the usual rules
of admissibility may be superseded by the due process clause.
The factors that are to be considered by the jury in reaching its sentence
recommendation are the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.78
Thus, most of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing will relate to
the presence or absence of these circumstances in the particular case. The
circumstances that are proved at the hearing are to be weighed and balanced
by the jury in deciding whether to recommend that the defendant be punished
by death or that he be imprisoned for life.7
9
The statutory list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is directed
toward relevant characteristics of the defendant and the crime he has been
found to have committed. The aggravating circumstances are factors that
should incline the jury to recommend a sentence of death. These are as fol-
lows:
(1) The capital felony wag committed by a person lawfully incar-
cerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capi-
tal felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding
or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from cus-
tody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was en-
gaged, or was an aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to
commit, any robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft privacy or the unlawful throwing, plac-
ing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the law-
ful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement
of the laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement
officer, employee of the Department of Correction, jailer, fire-
man, judge or justice, former judge or justice, prosecutor or
former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former
witness against the defendant, while engaged in the perform-
ance of his official duties because of the exercise of his official
duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more
than one person by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
79. Id
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(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part
of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and
which included the commission by the defendant of other
crimes of violence against another person or persons.80
The mitigating circumstances are factors that should move the jury to
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment. These are as follows:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activ-
ity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homi-
cidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice or accessory to the capital
felony committed by another person and his participation was
relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of
another person.
(6). The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital
felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in an-
other prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstances arising from the evidence which the
jury deems to have mitigating value.8 1
In reviewing the evidentiary rulings of the trial courts at sentencing hear-
ings, the North Carolina court has consistently held that evidence is irrelevant
to the issue of sentence and thus inadmissible unless it tends to establish the
existence or nonexistence of one or more of these statutory circumstances or in
some way relates to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the
offense.82 This is consistent with the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Lockett v. Ohio,83 in which the court overturned an Ohio statute that
limited the sentence's ability to consider factors in mitigation of sentence other
than those prescribed by the statute. There the Court held that the eighth
amendment requires that the sentences not be precluded from considering, as
a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record or any
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (Supp. 1979).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000() (1978).
82. State v. Johnson (Johnson II), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979) (gruesome pictures of
decomposed body of murder victim not tending to prove a fact in issue should have been ex-
cluded; eyewitness account of a gas chamber execution in 1957 irrelevant and properly excluded);
State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979) (affidavits alleging rehabilitation of convicted
murderer, opinion of affiant that death penalty does not deter crime, opinion of affiant that inno-
cent people are occasionally executed, and opposition of ministers to death penalty on religious
grounds properly excluded).
83. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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circumstance of the offense proffered by the defendant. s4
The North Carolina statute anticipated Lockett in that it specifically per-
mits consideration in mitigation of sentence of "[a]ny other circumstance aris-
ig from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value."8 5 The
evidence offered by defendant regarding this circumstance must relate to the
character of the defendant or the circumstances of the offense, 86 and if defend-
ant wishes to have the other mitigating circumstances recited to the jury in the
judge's charge and included on a written verdict form, a timely request must
be filed.8 7 Otherwise, the jury will be instructed only that it may consider any
additional circumstances that it deems to have mitigating value.88
Among the statutory mitigating circumstances aside from the "other miti-
gating circumstances" provision, only one has produced discussion by the
North Carolina court.89 This is the circumstance that addresses the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.90 An "impairment" of this capacity
should be considered by the jury in mitigation of sentence. In State v. Johnson
(Johnson 1)91 the court held it erroneous for the trial court not to distinguish
this test for mitigation of sentence from the traditional M'Naghten test for the
defense of insanity when instructing the jury on this issue. Writing for the
court, Justice Exum stated:
The trial court should have explained the difference between defend-
ant's capacity to know right from wrong. . and the impairment of
his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct from which
his evidence indicated and he contends he suffered. While defendant
might have known that his conduct was wrong, he might not have
been able to appreciate, le., to fully comprehend, or be fully sensible,
of its wrongfulness. Further, while his capacity to so appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct might not have been totaly obliterated, it
might have been impaired, le., lessened or diminished. The trial
court should also have more carefully explained that even if there
was no impairment of defendant's capacity to appreciate the crimi-
nality of his conduct, the jury should nevertheless find the existence
84. Id at 604. The Court pointed out that this rule does not preclude the exclusion of "evi-
dence not hearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense."
Id n.12.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1978).
86. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257
S.E.2d 551 (1979).
87. State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979).
88. Id
89. Although G.S. 15A-2000(f)(1) (no significant history of prior criminal activity) and G.S.
15A-2000(f)(2) (capital felony committed while defendant was under the influence of mental or
emotional disturbance) have appeared in recent cases. The court has not had occasion to rule on
them. See State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979); State v. Johnson
(Johnson IF), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979) (no prior criminal history); State v. Ferdinando,
298 N.C. 737, 260 S.E.2d 423 (1979); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979); State
v. Johnson (Johnson 11), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979) (crime committed under influence of
mental or emotional disturbance).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(6) (1978).
91. 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979).
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of this mitigating factor if it believed that defendant's capacity to
conform his conduct to the law, iLe., his capacity to refrain from ille-
gal conduct, was impaired. Again, this does not mean that defendant
must wholly lack all capacity to conform. It means only that such
capacity as he might otherwise have had in the absence of his mental
defect is lessened or diminished because of the defect.92
Obviously the court is attempting to ensure that the jury does not confuse the
defense of insanity with the "impaired capacity" circumstance for mitigation
of sentence. Thus, at least in cases in which expert testimony tends to show
that the defendant knew right from wrong at the time of commission of the
crime, the trial court at the sentencing hearing should explain the difference
between lack of capacity to know right from wrong and an impairment of a
defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law.93
In addition to an impairment of defendant's capacity caused by a mental
illness, there may be cases in which a defendant's capacity is sufficiently im-
paired by intoxication to entitle him to consideration by the jury of this issue.
In State v. Goodman,94 the court stated that intoxication is not to be consid-
ered in mitigation of sentence in every case in which the evidence shows de-
fendant to have been drinking at or before the time the crime was committed.
However, if the evidence shows that defendant's intoxication was of such a
degree that his ability to understand and control his action is affected, then this
circumstance may be considered.95 A defendant whose intoxication does not
rise to this level will not be entitled to consideration of this factor in mitigation
of sentence.
In contrast to the relatively few cases analyzing and applying the statutory
mitigating circumstances, many of the aggravating circumstances have been
discussed in recent North Carolina cases.96 Fifth on the statutory list of aggra-
vating circumstances is that which addresses the commission of other illegal
acts at or near the time of the commission of the capital felony. This circum-
stance will always be found to exist whenever a defendant is convicted of first
degree murder under the felony murder rule, because it restates one of the
essential elements of the offense, commission of a felony. A defendant con-
victed of felony murder automatically incurs an aggravating circumstance to
be held against him at the sentencing phase. On the other hand, no elements
92. 298 N.C. at 69-70, 259 S.E.2d at 614 (emphasis in original).
93. State v. Johnson (Johnson II), 298 N.C. 355, 375, 259 S.E.2d 752, 764-65 (1979).
94. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
95. Id at 31-33, 257 S.E.2d at 588-89.
96. To date no North Carolina case has addressed the aggravating circumstances relating to
murders committed by incarcerated persons (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(l) (1979 Supp.));
defendants previously convicted of another capital felony (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(2) ([979
Supp.)); murders of public officers in the course of their official duties (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(e)(8) (1979 Supp.)); murders committed by the use of a weapon or device hazardous to the
lives of more than one person in the course of which defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(10) (1979 Supp.)); or murders
committed in a course of conduct during which defendant committed crimes of violence against
another person or persons (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(1 1) (1979 Supp.)).
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of murder by premeditation and deliberation appear on the list of aggravating
circumstances, and a defendant convicted of first degree murder under this
theory incurs no "automatic" aggravating circumstance. Recognizing this sit-
uation as "incongruous," the North Carolina court in State v. Cherty97 held
that if defendant's first degree murder conviction is by reason of the felony
murder rule, the aggravating circumstance relating to the commission of other
crimes in conjunction with the murder should not be submitted to the jury at
the sentencing phase.98 This is consistent with the rule that a felony murder
defendant cannot be punished by separate sentences for both the homicide
and the underlying felony because the underlying crime merges into the felony
murder conviction. Just as the underlying felony should not provide the basis
for additional punishment, it should not be held against the defendant as a
factor in determining whether he should be put to death other than as an ele-
ment of the offense for which he stands convicted. However, where the evi-
dence is such that a defendant can be convicted of first degree murder under a
theory of premediation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule,
this issue may be submitted to the jury at the sentencing hearing.99 As a result
of this rule, the use of written verdicts at the guilt determination phase stating
the theory or theories upon which a first degree murder conviction is based
should be encouraged.10
The third listed aggravating circumstance, previous conviction of a vio-
lent felony, 101 addresses itself to conduct of the defendant at a time prior to
the events giving rise to the homicide prosecution. In this respect it differs
from all but one of the other circumstances on the statutory list,102 and in
particular should be contrasted with the fifth circumstance, which relates to
97. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979).
98. Id at 112-13, 257 S.E.2d at 567-68.
99. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24, 257 S.E.2d 569, 584-85 (1979).
100. The attendant difficulties of asking jurors to choose between alternate legal theories to
support a conviction are well demonstrated in State v. Goodman, supra, in which the following
colloquy occurred upon return of the jury's verdict:
CLERK: Members of the jury, look upon the defendant. You say Buck Junior Good-
man is guilty of murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation, or guilty of
murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule. Is that your verdict?
FOREMAN: Yes.
CLERK: Do say you all?
THE JURY ANSWERS AFFIRMATIVE.
COURT: For clarity, members of the jury, are you saying that you are returning as your
verdict that he is guilty of murder by both of these propositions of law?
FOREMAN: Murder in the first degree.
COURT: By premeditation and deliberation, and guilty of murder in the first degree by
the felony murder rule under both principles of law? Is that the verdict of the jury?
FOREMAN: It was murder in the first degree by premeditation, and it was our under-
standing that you also wanted us to put that other in there also.
298 N.C. at 18, 257 S.E.2d at 581. Obviously, the use of alternate theories and written verdicts
requires that the jury be thoroughly instructed as to the permissible verdicts it may return; even
when this is done, as the above dialogue shows, misunderstandings can occur.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(3) (Supp. 1979).
102. The second aggravating circumstance, previous conviction of another capital felony, also
addresses the conduct of defendant prior to the conduct for which he is being sentenced. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(2) (Supp. 1979).
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other crimes committed in the curse of defendant's conduct out of which the
capital felony charge arose. The "previous conviction" circumstance was dis-
cussed by the North Carolina court in State v. Goodman.10 3 There the court
held that submission of this issue to the jury at the sentencing hearing
requires that there be evidence that (1) defendant had been convicted
of a felony, that (2) the felony for which he was convicted involved
the "use or threat of violence to the person," and that (3) the conduct
upon which this conviction was based was conduct which occurred
prior to the events out of which the capital felony charge arose.l4
Submission of this issue requires evidence of an actual conviction, not merely
of arrest or accusation, and the offense of which defendant was convicted must
have involved use or threat of use of violence to a person; crimes against prop-
erty are not within the scope of this circumstance.10 5 In Goodman, the court
confirmed that the events triggering submission of this issue must have oc-
curred prior to the events out of which the charge of the capital felony for
which defendant is being sentenced arose. Otherwise, noted the court, the stat-
ute would be unnecessarily duplicative.' 0 6 The court also indicated that con-
victions based on conduct occurring after the commission of a capital felony
may not be considered as aggravating circumstances.10 7
To date there have been no cases in North Carolina in which a defendant
has received a death sentence solely on the basis of previous convictions with-
out the presence of other aggravating circumstances relating to the events
leading to the capital felony conviction. Whether a defendant could constitu-
tionally be sentenced to die where the state's only evidence of aggravating
circumstances is a prior record of violent criminal behavior is questionable.
As yet there has been no consideration of this issue by the United States
Supreme Court, but clearly there is room for operation of eighth amendment
principles in this context, where the decision as to punishment is based on a
factor unrelated to the circumstances of the crime.' 08
The fourth and seventh statutory aggravating circumstances are "[t]he
capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a law-
ful arrest or effecting an escape from custody"'1 9 and "[t]he capital felony was
committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental func-
103. 298 N.C. 1, 22-24, 257 S.E.2d 569, 583-84 (1979).
104. 298 N.C. at 22, 257 S.E.2d at 583.
105. Id at 23, 257 S.E.2d at 584.
106. Id Thus in Goodman, the jury properly considered a 1967 armed robbery conviction as
an aggravating circumstance, but the trial court refrained from instructing the jury to consider
convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping arising from the same events as the murder convic-
tion. Id at 23-24, 257 S.E.2d at 584.
107. Id at 23, 257 S.E.2d at 584.
108. For instance, if two codefendants are convicted of a first degree murder in which no
aggravating circumstances are present and one defendant has a ten year-old armed robbery con-
viction on his record, he is subject to the death penalty while his codefendant is not. Would a
sentence of death under these circumstances be "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime" and therefore unconstitutionally "excessive"? See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (Supp. 1979).
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tion or the enforcement of laws."' 10 The degree of overlap between these two
circumstances is apparent: whenever a murder is committed in the course of
avoiding arrest or escape from custody or to prevent the reporting of an of-
fense to the authorities, the enforcement of laws is disrupted or hindered. This
is another situation in which the nature of the offense can create an automatic
cumulation of aggravating circumstances. In State v. Goodman,"l' the evi-
dence showed that the victim of an assault by defendant earlier in the day was
abducted and killed at least in part to prevent him from reporting the as-
sault."12 The trial court at the sentencing hearing submitted both the "avoid
arrest" and "disrupt or hinder law enforcement" issues to the jury, reciting
substantially the same evidence for each issue. 113 The North Carolina
Supreme Court held it improper to submit the two issues on the same evidence
on the ground that this creates "an unnecessary duplication of the circum-
stances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of ag-
gravating circumstances against the defendant.""14 The court, however,
declined to announce a general rule as to when either or both of these issues
should be submitted, stating only that "[wie can envision the difficulty this
court is going to encounter in construing and applying subsections (e)(4) and
(e)(7) . . .. [sluffice it to say for the purposes of the case at hand, the trial
court erred in submitting issues of aggravating circumstances pursuant to both
subsections." 115
On the facts of Goodman, the court held that only the "avoid arrest" cir-
cumstance was properly submitted. Noting that every murder in some sense
aids the criminal in avoiding detection in that the victim is silenced, the court
held that the application of this circumstance is to be limited to cases in which
at least one of the purposes motivating the killing is a desire on the part of the
defendant to avoid apprehension. 16 This circumstance is not invoked merely
by the fact of death, and thus cannot be used as a "catch-all" provision when
there is no evidence of other aggravating circumstances.
Given the inherent overlap of the "avoid arrest" and "disrupt or hinder
the enforcement of laws" circumstances, the court should interpret the statute
so as to limit their applicability to separate factual patterns not covered by one
or more of the other circumstances. When there is doubt as to which of these
two circumstances should be submitted, perhaps the more specific of the two,
"avoid arrest," should be favored over the less specific, "disrupt or hinder the
enforcement of laws." The "avoid arrest" circumstance could be employed
when the motivation for a murder is to prevent detection or disclosure of a
crime previously committed by the defendant or when the homicide is actually
committed while the defendant is being pursued by or escaping from the cus-
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(7) (Supp. 1979).
111. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
112. Id at 27-28, 257 S.E.2d 586.
113. Id at 28, 257 S.E.2d at 587.
114. Id at 29, 257 S.E.2d at 587.
115. Id at 28, 257 S.E.2d at 587 (emphasis in original).
116. Id at 26-27, 257 S.E.2d at 585-86.
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tody of the authorities. The operative fact should be that defendant has al-
ready committed a crime or is suspected of committing a crime for which he
could be arrested. The "disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws" circum-
stance would arise when a homicide is committed where defendant has no pre-
existing ground to fear his own arrest. Thus a homicide committed to prevent
the arrest of someone other than the defendant would fall into this category.11 7
The aggravating circumstance relating to murders committed for pecuni-
ary gain 118 has appeared in two cases. In State v. Bai-feldt 9 the supreme
court, without discussion, found no error in submission of this issue to the jury
when the evidence tended to show that defendant poisoned her victim after the
victim discovered that defendant had forged checks drawn on his account, and
threatened to "turn her in." 120 In State v. Cherry,121 this issue was submitted
to the jury in an armed robbery prosecution, but was not involved in the
supreme court's disposition of the case. 122 In both cases the murders were
committed after defendant had wrongfully obtained money from the victim.
In Ba Tield the murder was motivated by a desire to prevent disclosure of the
crime to the authorities. 123 In Cherry the murder appears to have been com-
mitted in the course of a struggle over defendant's gun.124 In neither case did
the killing occur in order that defendant might incur a pecuniary gain; rather,
the murders seem to have been committed to prevent apprehension of defend-
117. But see State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979). In Bar leld the evidence
tended to show that defendant poisoned her victim after he discovered that defendant had payed
checks on his account and threatened to "turn her in" to the authorities. Id at 311-12, 259 S.E.2d
at 519-20. The trial court did not submit the "avoid arrest" aggravating circumstance at the sen-
tencing hearing, but did submit the "disrupt or hinder the enforcement of laws" circumstance,
which was answered by the jury in the affirmative. Id at 317, 259 S.E.2d at 523. The supreme
court, without discussion, found no error relating to the submission of the aggravating circum-
stances. Id at 354, 259 S.E.2d at 544.
Given the rationale in Goodman for not submitting more than one aggravating circumstance
on the same evidence, perhaps the murder of a police officer in the course of an arrest could give
rise to only one aggravating circumstance, even though three are applicable: "avoid arrest;" "dis-
rupt or hinder the enforcement of laws;" and G.S. 15A-2000(e)(8) (capital felony committed
against law-enforcement officer in the course of his duties). However, it could be argued that
police officers fall into a special class under the statute, and the killing of a police officer, regard-
less of the nature of the duty he is performing, is an aggravating circumstance not related to the
defendant's desire to avoid arrest. Thus, even though both circumstances may arise on the same
evidence, two public policies are at work, and both circumstances should be submitted, whereas in
Goodman only one public policy was violated by the homicide-the policy against homicides
committed to avoid detection or disclosure of others crimes.
The court in Goodman recognized the problems necessarily arising from the inevitability of
overlap and the holding that the two circumstances in that case should not have been submitted
because they arose from the same evidence. The court stated that it may be permissible to submit
more than one aggravating circumstance on the same evidence, but this "will normally occur
where the defendant's motive is being examined rather than where the state relies upon a specific
factual element of aggravation." 298 N.C. at 30, 257 S.E.2d at 588. In doubtful cases, said the
court, the trial courts should err in favor of the defendant, whose life is at stake, by refusing to
instruct the jury on multiple aggravating circumstances arising from the same evidence. Id
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (Supp. 1979).
119. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
120. See note 117 supra.
121. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979).
122. See text at notes 97-100 supra.
123. 298 N.C. at 311-12, 259 S.E.2d at 519-20.
124. 298 N.C. at 88-89, 257 S.E.2d at 554.
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ant for a previously committed pecuniary crime that had gone awry. Were
they committed for pecuniary gain, or for some other reason associated with
but not identical to defendant's intention to wrongfully obtain money? This is
the basic difficulty with the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance: it re-
quires an assessment of defendant's purpose in committing a murder. It is not
unique in this respect; at least five of the eleven aggravating circumstances are
addressed in some way to the reason for which defendant committed the
crime.125 However, it may be that this is the most difficult of the five to deter-
mine from factual testimony. The courts may overcome this difficulty by re-
fusing to inquire into the subjective motivation of each defendant in
commiting a murder and submitting this issue more or less mechanically
whenever the killing is part of a course of conduct involving pecuniary gain by
the defendant. This would, however, produce in most cases an overlap prob-
lem among several of the aggravating circumstances. For instance, the perpe-
trator of a robbery-murder may have killed his victim primarily to reduce the
possibility of apprehension. This gives use to the "avoid arrest" aggravating
circumstance of G.S. 15A-2000(e)(4). In order to submit this circumstance,
there must be evidence tending to show that fear of apprehension at least in
part motivated the killing.'2 6 Does the fact that defendant robbed his victim
automatically give rise to the "pecuniary gain" aggravating circumstance? If
so, a cumulation of aggravating circumstances is automatic, regardless of the
proof that the real motivation for the killing was fear of apprehension. While
there is no way of knowing whether the legislature intended that there be
proof of motivation before the "pecuniary gain" circumstance should be sub-
mitted, the provision should be so interpreted to avoid the needless cumula-
tion of aggravating circumstances.
Last among the statutory aggravating circumstances considered by the
North Carolina court in recent months is G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9): "The capital
felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'127 Perhaps the most diffi-
cult of all to apply, this circumstance addresses neither the factual pattern in
which a murder is committed nor the purposes or circumstances of the perpe-
trator or victim. Rather, it provides a means by which society expresses moral
outrage for certain killings beyond that aroused by any murder, and estab-
lishes that some murderers may be put to death solely on the basis of the level
of revulsion that their acts incite in the jury.
125. These are:
G.S. 15A-2000(e)(4)---felony committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing arrest
or escaping from custody,
(5) felony committed in the course of some other crime (requires an assessment of
defendant's intent to commit the undulging crime)
(6) felony committed for pecuniary gain
(7) felony committed to disrupt or hinder enforcement of law;
(8) felony committed against a public officer while engaged in the exercise of his
official duty or because of the exercise of his official duty.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (Supp. 1979).
126. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979), discussed in text at notes 111-16
su/pra.
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (Supp. 1979).
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Of the four operative words of this circumstance, the first is of critical
importance: the capital felony must be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Therefore this issue does not arise in every case.128 As interpreted by the court
in State v. Goodman,129 this issue arises from "evidence that the brutality in-
volved in the murder in question. . . exceed[s] that normally present in any
killing."' 130 Adopting a construction of similar language in the Florida stat-
ute131 by the courts of that state, the North Carolina court held that "this
provision is directed at 'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessa-
rily torturous to the victim,' "132 thus limiting application of this circumstance
to "acts done to the victim during the commission of the capital felony it-
self."' 133 The court held this issue properly submitted in Goodman, in which
the victim was beaten, shot, locked in the trunk of an automobile while still
alive, later killed by gunshots to the head, and left on a railroad track in hope
that the body would be mutilated beyond recognition. 134 The court also held
this issue to have been properly submitted in State v. Johnson (Johnson1),135
in which the sixty-five year old victim was strangled into unconsciousness, sex-
ually molested and then stabbed to death, 136 and in State v. Johnson (Johnson
II),13 7 in which the victim, a young boy, was strangled and sexually as-
saulted.' 38
The use of this aggravating circumstance in such clear-cut cases of physi-
cal abuse has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court against the
contention that this circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. 139 However, use
of a somewhat similar aggravating circumstance in the Georgia statute 140
where the victim was not physically abused has led the Supreme Court to va-
cate the ensuing death sentence in Godfrey v. Georgia.'4' There the Court
decided that the eighth amendment precluded imposition of the death penalty
against a defendant who killed his wife and mother-in-law with shotgun blasts
to the head when the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury was
"that the offense of murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
128. If the crime is to be submitted to the jury, defendant may request an instruction that not
every murder is necessarily especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Denial of this request is error.
State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 81-82, 257 S.E.2d 597, 621 (1979).
129. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
130. Id at 25, 257 S.E.2d at 585.
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (Supp. 1979).
132. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973) cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974), quotedat 298
N.C. 25, 257 S.E.2d 585.
133. 298 N.C. at 25, 257 S.E.2d at 585.
134. Id at 4-7, 257 S.E.2d at 574-75.
135. 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979).
136. Id at 82, 257 S.E.2d at 621-22.
137. 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979).
138. Id at 358-59, 371, 259 S.E.2d at 755, 762.
139. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976). The victim in Proffitt was killed by stab-
bing. Id at 245.
140. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978) ("The offense. . . was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim.")
141. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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inhuman." 142 When this aggravating circumstance is applied in cases other
than those in which physical abuse of the victim precedes the killing, wrote
Justice Stewart for the plurality of four,143 the cases in which the sentence of
death is imposed cannot be distinguished from those in which it is not:144
A person of ordinary sensibility could easily characterize almost
every murder as "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhu-
man." Such a view may, in fact, have been one to which the mem-
bers of the jury in this case subscribed. If so, their preconceptions
were not dispelled by the trial judge's sentencing instructions. These
gave the jury no guidance concerning the meaning of any of
§ (b)(7)'s terms. In fact, the jury's interpretation of § (b)(7) can only
be the subject of sheer speculation.' 45
Without evidence of physical abuse to sustain the jury's finding of this circum-
stance, the decision to impose the death penalty on the basis of the jury's im-
pression as to the egregiousness of the defendant's acts in perpetrating the
murder becomes totally discretionary. This violates the mandate of Gregg and
recreates the possibility of arbitrary and capricious use of the death penalty
proscribed in Furman. 146
Does submission of the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circum-
stance under the North Carolina statute to the sentencing jury in cases in
which the murder victim was neither tortured nor sexually molested violate
the Godfrey holding? Thus far the reported North Carolina cases disclose that
this aggravating circumstance was submitted to the sentencing jury in two
cases of murder by arsenic poisoning, and in both cases the jury decided this
issue in the affirmative.147 In the earlier of the two cases, State v. Barfteld,148
the court affirmed the sentence of death imposed pursuant to the jury's finding
that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'149 While death
by arsenic poisoning is slow and painful' 50 it entails no specific act of physical
abuse of the victim by the poisoner other than the murderous act itself. Thus
it would seem that unless every murder by arsenic poison isper se especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel-and every poisoner subject to a sentence of death
precisely because the murder was accomplished by poisoning' 5 '-then a par-
142. Id at 426. Note the disparity between the circumstance found to exist by the jury and the
complete text of the statute at note 130 supra.
143. The plurality opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Id. at 421.
Marshall and Brennan, J.J., concurred in the judgment while adhering to their belief that capital
punishment isper se cruel and unusual. Id at 433. Dissenting were the Chief Justice in a sepa-
rate opinion and Mr. Justice White, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Id at 442, 444.
144. Id at 433.
145. Id at 428-29.
146. See id at 427-28.
147. State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259
S.E.2d 510 (1979).
148. See note 117 supra.
149. See 298 N.C. at 317, 354, 259 S.E.2d at 523, 544. In addition to finding the murder
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," the jury also found it to have been committed for pecuni-
ary gain and to hinder law enforcement. Id at 317, 259 S.E.2d at 523.
150. See 298 N.C. at 309-15, 259 S.E.2d at 518-22.
151. This would be tantamount to imposing a presumptive death sentence in poisoning cases
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ticular poisoning for which the perpetrator receives a death sentence is indis-
tinguishable from every other poisoning. The infliction of death for the poison
murder would be unconstitutionally arbitrary, and use of this aggravating cir-
cumstance to impose the death penalty in a poisoning case unconstitutionally
vague under Godfrey. Unless the North Carolina court is willing to rehear
Baqield and reconsider it in light of Godfrey on this issue, the sentence of
death in that case will have been unconstitutionally imposed. 152
Apart from discussing the applicability of the particular aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in various fact situations, the North Carolina court
also has addressed the more general question of the burden of proof of facts
giving rise to these circumstances. The sentencing jury's task of basing its sen-
tencing recommendation on the existence or nonexistence of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances 153 raises the issue of the quantum of proof required
to establish the existence of the circumstances. The capital punishment statute
specifies that the burden of proof of aggravating circumstances is the same
"reasonable doubt" standard applied to proof of elements of a substantive of-
fense. 154 The statute does not, however, address the burden of proof of facts
that may be considered in mitigation of sentence. In State v. Johnson (Johnson
-)15 the supreme court held that since it is the defendant who will be urging
the jury to consider circumstances in mitigation of sentence, logically the bur-
den of persuading the jury that these circumstances exist should be placed on
him.156 The standard of proof to be applied to the facts is a preponderance of
the evidence. 157
An allocation of the burden of proof of an issue in a criminal trial to the
defendant may unduly infringe his due process rights under the doctrine of
Mullaney v. Wilbur,' s which requires the state to prove all the elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The North Carolina court in Johnson I
found no violation of the Mullaney doctrine in placing the burden of proof of
mitigating circumstances on the defendant, because these factors are not ele-
that could be overcome only on proof of mitigating circumstances. Surely such a system could not
survive scrutiny under Woodson v. North Carolina, note 15 supra.
152. No specific assignments of error relating to the submission of aggravating circumstances
were brought forward in Ba f6eld; instead defendant chose to attack the entire capital punishment
statute as unconstitutional, arguing inter alia that all the aggravating circumstances listed in the
statute are impermissibly vague. 298 N.C. at 343-54, 259 S.E.2d at 537-44. Addressing this point
the court said that "[tlhe issues which are posed to a jury at the sentencing phase of North Caro-
lina's bifurcated proceeding have a common sense core of meaning. Jurors who are sitting in a
criminal trial ought to be capable of understanding them and applying them when they are given
appropriate intructions by the trial court judge." Id at 353, 259 S.E.2d at 543. In holding that the
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" circumstance was properly submitted, the court appears to be includ-
ing murders by poisoning within the "core of meaning" of those words. Id at 354, 259 S.E.2d at
544. This is not consistent with the interpretation given this circumstance in Goodman and John-
son r, and probably cannot survive scrutiny under Godfrey.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1978).
155. 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979).
156. Id at 75-76, 257 S.E.2d at 617-18.
157. Id
158. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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ments of the crime with which defendant is charged.' 5 9 The Johnson I hold-
ing was confirmed in State v. Barfeld16 ° in which the court rejected
defendant's contention that due process requires the state to prove that no
mitigating circumstances exist. 161
Viewed together, the recent North Carolina cases establish that the sen-
tencing jury's decision should be based solely on the legislatively-prescribed
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Although many questions sur-
rounding the use of this method of sentencing remain unanswered, the North
Carolina court has refused to sanction the indiscriminate submission of aggra-
vating circumstances to the jury in hopes of obtaining a recommendation that
the death penalty be imposed in as many cases as possible. On the other hand,
the court has been willing to allow the defendant some latitude in presenting
facts in mitigation of sentence so long as they relate to the defendant or the
circumstances of the crime. This conception of the purposes of the capital
punishment statute should ensure that the penalty of death is imposed, if at all,
without either the arbitrariness of the pre-Furman era or the harsh certainty of
the period between Waddell and Woodson.
IV. THE DECISION: THE SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION
After hearing the evidence, the arguments of counsel,162 and the instruc-
tions of the court, 163 the jury is to retire to deliberate and render a sentence
recommendation. 64 The recommendation of the jury will control whether the
159. 298 N.C. at 75-76, 257 S.E.2d at 617-18. In Johnson I the court applied its reasoning in
State v. Williams, 295 N.C. 655, 249 S.E.2d 209 (1978), a kidnapping case, to the capital punish-
ment statute. The North Carolina kidnapping statute, G.S. 14-39, essentially creates a single of-
fense, kidnapping, but requires imposition of a lesser sentence when the kidnapping is
"mitigated". Mitigated kidnapping exists when all other elements of the crime of kidnapping are
proved, and it is also proved that the person kidnapped was released by the defendant in a safe
place and had not been sexually assaulted or seriously injured. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (Supp.
1979). Proof of the mitigating factors is irrelevant to the issue of guilt of the crime of kidnapping
and is relevant only to sentencing. Unless these factors are proved, the defendant will be sen-
tenced for the crime of kidnapping. Proof of these facts in mitigation of sentence is therefore on
defendant. The standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 295 N.C. at 669-70, 249
S.E.2d at 719. In Willians the court held it not a violation of due process under Mullaney to place
the burden of proving facts in mitigation of sentence on defendant. Id at 674-79, 249 S.E.2d at
722-25. The court reasoned that the mitigating circumstances are analogous to an affirmative
defense (not a negation of an element of the offense), for which the burden of proof may be
constitutionally placed upon the defendant under Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Id
160. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
161. Id at 353-54, 259 S.E.2d at 543-44. The defendant's burden of proof can be lightened to
some extent if a peremptory instruction is requested. Where all the evidence, if believed, tends to
show the existence of a mitigating circumstance, defendant is entitled to a peremptory instruction
requiring the jury to find the existence of that circumstance. The jury may fail to find the exist-
ence of the circumstance if it rejects the evidence because of a lack of faith in its credibility. State
v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. at 75-76, 257 S.E.2d at 617-18.
162. G.S. 15A-2000(a)(4) permits counsel for the state and the defendant to present arguments
for or against the sentence of death. The defendant's counsel is given the last argument at the
sentencing hearing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(4) (1978).
163. The judge is required to instruct the jury that it must consider any aggravating or mitigat-
ing circumstances supported by the evidence. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
164. Id.
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defendant will be imprisoned for life or punished by death. 165 In'reaching this
momentous decision the jury is guided by limitations on the matter that may
be considered, a requirement that the factors that are considered be weighed
and balanced, procedural conventions to promote uniformity in rendering of
verdicts, and a requirement of unanimity. In addition, the statute provides an
alternative method of sentencing to be used in cases in which the jury is un-
able to perform its function of deciding.
Before the jury decides, it must deliberate. Its deliberations are to be lim-
ited to determining the following:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circum-
stances . . . exist;
(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances . . . , which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or cir-
cumstances found, exist; and,
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the State's prison for
life.16 6
The limitations imposed by this language on the matter that may be consid-
ered by the jury in reaching its decision are apparent: the jury is to consider
only the evidence tending to establish the existence or nonexistence of the stat-
utory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus the jury should not be
exposed to matters that may influence its decision as to sentence other than
facts tending to prove or disprove relevant facts.167 One factor that should not
be suggested to the jury, either during the presentation of evidence or the argu-
ments of counsel, is the possibility of parole for a prisoner serving a life sen-
tence.168 Despite this prohibition, however, a juror will not be allowed to
impeach his verdict by giving testimony that the death penalty was imposed to
foreclose the possibility of parole. 169 In addition to the possibility of parole,
165. The sentence recommendation of the jury is binding on the trial court. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2002 (1978); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979); State v. Atkinson, 298
N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979); State v. Johnson (Johnson 11), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752
(1979).
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
167. As to the relevancy requirement for facts offered in mitigation of sentence, see text at
notes 72-77 supra.
168. In State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979) the district attorney in final argu-
ment at the sentencing hearing actually read the parole statute to the jury and asked
Can you take a chance, ladies and gentlemen of the jury? I don't know what the parole
board would do in the future. I don't know of [sic] they would ever parole him or not,
but can you take that sort of chance that twenty years from now he could be walking
around on the streets after having done the things that he's done?
id at 502, 251 S.E.2d at 429. Although the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial
on other grounds, the court held the reference to the parole statute clearly erroneous, stating that
"[n]either the State nor the defendant should be allowed to speculate upon the outcome of possible
appeals, paroles, executive commutations or pardons." Id
An argument to the jury that does not use the word "parole" or state that a defendant receiv-
ing a life sentence could be out of prison in twenty years is unobjectionable, however, even if the
district attorney fIfs the jury that "common sense will tell you, that the only way you can ever be
sure this man wilinever walk out again is to give him the death penalty." State v. Johnson (John-
son 11); 298 N.C. 355, 366-67, 259 S.E.2d 752, 760 (1979).
169. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 99-102, 251 S.E.2d 551, 560-61 (1979).
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the jury should not be told of the existence of judicial review of the sen-
tence.170 Any suggestion to the members of the jury that they can depend
upon review of their decision to correct mistakes or to relieve them of their
responsibility as decision-makers is reversible error.17 1 The jury is to confine
its deliberations to the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
In considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the jury
must not only determine whether any such circumstances exist,172 but the jury
must also decide whether the aggravating circumstances found to exist "are
sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty."'173 This
requirement that the jury assess the gravity of the aggravating circumstances
permits the jury to spare the life of a defendant even when there is no evidence
of facts in mitigation of sentence or where these factors are outweighed by the
aggravating circumstances. 174
In addition to assessing the weight of the aggravating circumstances, the
jury must balance them against the mitigating circumstances. The language of
the statute directs the jury to decide whether the mitigating circumstances out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances.' 75 The thrust of this provision appears
to be that the jury should recommend a sentence of death whenever the aggra-
vating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the
death penalty and the mitgating circumstances are not more substantial than
the aggravating circumstances. The statute thus appears to "prefer" use of the
death penalty when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are equally
substantial. The North Carolina court, however, has chosen not to follow this
clear statutory language. In State v. Goodman, 176 after reversing the trial court
on other grounds, the court without discussion suggested that on remand the
jury be asked the following question: "Do you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances found by you outweigh the mitigat-
ing circumstances found by you?" 177 Such language, said the court, "would be
more appropriate" than an issue framed in terms of the wording of the stat-
170. State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979).
171. The rule applies both to the guilt phase and the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial.
Id at 497-502, 254 S.E.2d at 427-29. Such suggestions are deemed to be so prejudicial to defend-
ant that counsel's failure to object to an improper argument does not waive defendant's right to
review of the issue. Id at 498, 251 S.E.2d at 427.
172. The standard of proof for establishing the existence of an aggravating circumstance is
"beyond a reasonable doubt;" for mitigating circumstances the standard is a preponderance of the
evidence. See text at notes 154-57 supra.
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(2).
174. In State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979) the jury found that the defend-
ant committed a first degree murder while attempting to commit a robbery and that the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The jury also found that defendant had no significant
history of prior criminal conduct. Although the jury felt that the mitigating circumstance was
outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, it found that the aggravating circumstances were
not sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty. The court sentenced the
defendant to life imprisonment on the basis of the jury's recommendations. Id at 679, 259 S.E.2d
at 862.
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(3) (1978).
176. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
177. Id at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 591.
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ute.178 Not only has the court reversed the "preference" of the statute in favor
of a life sentence when the aggravating and mitigating factors are equally sub-
stantial, it has introduced a requirement-nowhere to be found in the text of
the statute-that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating cir-
cumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This rewriting of the statute by the
supreme court may be intended as a saving construction, its purpose being to
fend off an attack on the statute as prescribing an unconstitutional mandatory
death penalty by employing a presumption in favor of its use. In State v.
Barield'79 the court held that the statute does not create an unconstitutional
mandatory death penalty.180 In so doing, the court stated that the jury must
determine whether the aggravating circumstance "outweighs any mitigating
circumstance in a sufficiently substantial manner so as to call for the death
penalty."' 81 Does this language introduce the new requirement that the jury
find the aggravating circumstances to "substantially" outweigh the mitigating
circumstances before recommending a sentence of death? If so, does this re-
quirement arise from the capital punishment statute? Is it a gloss on the stat-
ute imposed by the eighth amendment? The court has twice altered the
balancing test to be employed by the jury in deciding whether to impose the
death penalty on the basis of the relative weight of the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances. On neither occasion has the court seen fit to disclose its
reasons for deviating from the language set down by the legislature. Whatever
the reasons for this process may be, the court is overdue in making them pub-
lic. If the court feels that the statute as written by the General Assembly is
unconstitutionally drawn, it should say so. A case-by-case process of cor-
recting deficiencies in the statute to protect it from being overturned by the
United States Supreme Court does neither the statute nor the North Carolina
court any good.
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the correct test for balancing aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstance against each other, it is clear that the jury
should not "balance" the circumstances by imposing the death sentence when-
ever the number of aggravating circumstances exceeds the number of mitigat-
ing circumstances, or by recommending life imprisonment when the situation
is reversed. Nevertheless, defendant is not entitled to an instruction that the
jury might recommend a sentence of life imprisonment even though it finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
This instruction, said the court in State v. Goodman would return the sentenc-
ing procedure to the unbridled discretion method in use prior to Furman.18 2
The process of weighing and balancing the aggravating and mitigating
178. Id
179. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
180. See text at note 9 supra.
181. 298 N.C. at 351, 259 S.E.2d at 543.
182. 298 N.C. at 34-35, 257 S.E.2d at 590. But see State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d
502 (1979). In Taylor the jury found the aggravating circumstance sufficiently substantial to call
for imposition of the death penalty and found the mitigating circumstance insufficient to outweigh
the aggravating circumstance, but then recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. Sentence
was imposed pursuant to the jury recommendation. Id at 407-08, 259 S.E.2d at 504.
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circumstances should guide the jury toward a sentence recommendation. If
the jury finds that the aggravating circumstance has been proved, the recom-
mendation should be a sentence of imprisonment for life. 183 A finding that
although an aggravating circumstance has been proved, it is not sufficiently
substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty should also lead the
jury to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment.18 4 Similarly, a finding
that the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances weigh in the
defendant's favor should guide the jury toward a recommendation of life im-
prisonment. Only if the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial
to call for imposition of-the death penalty and the balancing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances weighs against the defendant should the jury
recommend a sentence of death.'85 In all events-whether the recommenda-
tion of the jury is for a sentence of death or of life imprisonment-the jury's
recommendation must have the unanimous support of all twelve jurors.' 86
The unanimity requirement must be satisfied by a poll of the jury after a sen-
tence recommendation is returned. 187
These safeguards over the decision making process both enhance and de-
ter a final, binding decision by the jury. The process is enhanced by the rela-
tively clear, straightforward presentation to the jury of its task. The jurors are
not left to agonize over how they should reach their decision. A conclusion to
the decision-making process is deterred, however, by the inherent ambiguity of
the jury's duty to characterize certain facts as "substantial," by the balancing
of circumstances, and by the requirement that a unanimous recommendation
must be returned "within a reasonable time."'188 Given these factors, there
must be an alternative means of concluding the sentencing process when the
jury cannot or will not come to an agreement. The statute provides the alter-
native: "If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, unanimously agree to its
sentence recommendation, the judge shall impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment; provided, however, that the judge shall in no instance impose the death
penalty when the jury cannot agree unanimously to its sentence recommenda-
tion."'189 Should the jury be told of this alternative method of concluding the
decision making process at sentencing hearing? In State v. Johnson (Johnson
11)190 the court held that an instruction to this effect is not a proper matter for
183. See, ag., State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 259 S.E.2d 227 (1979).
184. See, ag., State v. Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979).
185. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (1978). Whenever a sentence of death is recom-
mended the jury foreman must sign a writing attesting that the process of analysis stated in the
text has been followed. Id.
186. N.C. GuN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1978).
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id In State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 964 (1979), the
jury's deliberations over the sentence recommendation continued for fourteen hours before the
jury announced that it was unable to reach a unanimous decision. The trial court then discharged
the jury and entered a sentence of life imprisonment. Id at 345, 250 S.E.2d at 264. In State v.
Johnson (Johnson I1), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979) the court held that the determination
of when a "reasonable time" has elapsed is at the discretion of the trial judge. Id at 370, 259
S.E.2d at 762.
190. 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979).
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jury consideration. The decision as to sentence, said the court, is the jury's; the
jury should not be encouraged to escape its task by deciding not to decide. 19 1
The sentence recommendation of the jury is binding on the trial judge. 192
If the jury's recommendation is that the defendant be sentenced to death, the
judge must impose a sentence of death in accordance with procedures that
originated in 1909.193
V. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
The capital punishment statute provides for automatic review of every
conviction resulting in a sentence of death by the North Carolina Supreme
Court.' 94 The supreme court's duty of review encompasses five distinct tasks.
The court must consider assignments of errors of law arising from the guilt
phase and assignments of errors of law arising from the sentencing phase. 195
In addition, the court must determine whether the jury's findings of aggravat-
ing circumstances are supported by the record, 196 and whether the sentence of
death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or some other
arbitrary factor.197 Finally, the court must consider whether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant. 198
The court's first task, review of assignments of errors of law of the guilt
phase of the trial, is the basic function of an appellate court and thus is not
confined to issues relating solely to the sentence imposed. 199 The court's sec-
ond task, however, is directly related to the issue of sentence. In reviewing
errors assigned at the sentencing phase of the trial-assuming no error is
found in the guilt phase-the court may reverse and remand only for a new
sentencing hearing.2°° An error in the sentencing phrase is not grounds for a
191. Id at 369-70, 259 S.E.2d at 761-62. Justice Exum dissented on this point, arguing that
since a failure to agree is tantamount to an agreement to recommend life imprisonment, the jury
should be informed of the consequences of disagreement. This would preclude an incorrect as-
sumption by the jurors that a deadlock would result in a new proceeding before a new jury. Id at
378-80, 259 S.E.2d at 766-67.
192. See note 165 supra.
193. G.S. 15A-2002 directs that the judge impose sentence "in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 15, Article 19 of the General Statutes." Article 19, originally enacted as chapter 443 of
the 1909 North Carolina Public Laws, abolished hanging as the method for infliction of death and
substituted in its place death by electrocution. Law of March 6, 1909, ch. 443, § 1, 1909 N.C. Pub.
Laws 758. The present provision, enacted in 1935, substituted the administration of lethal gas as
the approved method. Law of March 4, 1935, ch. 294, § 1, 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 321 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-187 (1978)). The 1909 provisions for imposition of sentence and certifica-
tion of the death sentence were amended in 1951 Law of April 13, 1951, ch. 899,.§ 1, 1951 N.C.
Sess. Laws 881 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-189 (1978)).
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (1978).
195. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (1978).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978).
197. Id
198. Id
199. Of course, where prejudicial error is discovered in the guilt phase, a new trial must be
held and the former sentence of death is nullified. See, e.g., State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 257
S.E.2d 391 (1979); State v. Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 251 S.E.2d 425 (1979).
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(3) (1978).
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reversal of the conviction.
In each of the four North Carolina cases that have been remanded for a
new sentencing hearing the error requiring reversal was either the erroneous
submission of an aggravating circumstance or a prejudicially insufficient in-
struction as to mitigating circumstance.20 1 While the court has not yet an-
nounced a general test for determining when an instruction is prejudicially
insufficient, it has stated a rule concerning erroneous submission of an aggra-
vating circumstance. In State v. Goodman202 the court held that a new sen-
tencing hearing must be held whenever there is a "reasonable possibility" that
the erroneously submitted aggravating circumstance might have contributed to
the jury's recommendation of a sentence of death.203
The third task of the supreme court in reviewing death cases is to review
the record to determine whether it supports the jury's findings as to aggravat-
ing circumstances. A fourth, slightly different task requires that the court de-
cide whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factors. In performing these two
tasks the supreme court's function is in some respects similar to a trial court's
traditional role: the court examines the facts to determine whether the deci-
sion of the jury is supported by the evidence. In further contrast to the tradi-
tional function of an appellate court, the supreme court is not authorized to
order further proceedings by the trial court if it finds that the evidence does
not support the jury's sentence recommendation. Rather, the supreme court
must overturn the death sentence and impose a sentence of life imprison-
ment.204
Finally, the reviewing court, after having examined the law and the facts,
must examine the sentence. If the sentence of death is excessive or dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, the supreme court must vacate
the death sentence and enter a sentence of life imprisonment.20 5 The court
will not address this issue, however, unless both phases of the trial are free
from error.206 In the single case in which this issue was reached, State v.
Batfield,207 the court decided that the sentence of death was not excessive or
disproportionate considering both the crime and the defendant.20 8
In Barfield, the court spoke of its power to overturn death sentences as a
matter of "statutory discretion to set aside the sentence imposed. '209 The lan-
201. See State v. Johnson (Johnson II), 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E.2d 752 (1979); State v. Johnson
(Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597 (1979) (instruction prejudicially insufficient); State v.
Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979)
(aggravating circumstances erroneously submitted).
202. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
203. Id at 29, 259 S.E.2d at 587.
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978).
205. Id
206. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 35, 257 S.E.2d at 590-91. In Goodman, the court indicated
that the decision of the jury as to sentence should be accorded great deference. Id
207. 298 N.C. 306, 249 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
208. Id at 354-55, 249 S.E.2d at 544.
209. Id at 355, 249 S.E.2d at 544.
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guage of the statute, however, appears to impart no discretion to the court on
this issue; its language is mandatory, not permissive. 210 The statute requires
the court to overturn sentences of death if the jury's finding of aggravating
circumstances was not supported by the record, if the sentence of death was
imposed by reason of passion or prejudice, or if the sentence is excessive or
disproportionate. 211 The court's duty in this area is a positive one; it is not a
matter of discretion to be exercised or withheld as the court sees fit.
The supreme court's duty of review of death penalty cases thus consists of
five separate tasks divided into two main groups. The first group, concerning
review of errors of law, is closely associated with the traditional function of an
appellate court. Error in the proceedings below mandates reversal and re-
mand for new proceedings if it is prejudicial error; the "harmless error" rule
remains in force. The second group of tasks, concerning review of the factual
record and of the sentence imposed, departs from the typical duties of an ap-
pellate court. In this area there can be no "harmless error." If the court's
review of the record of the sentence discloses a departure from the statutory
norm, the sentence of death must be overturned. Although deference may be
accorded to the decision of the sentencing jury, the court must be mindful of
its responsibilities to prevent the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty con-
demned as unconstitutional in Furman.
VI. ST4TE V B4pFIELD: THE NORTH CAROLINA STATUTE
AND THE CONSTITUTION
In the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia the United States Supreme Court
held that "the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitu-
tion."'212 At the same time, however, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the court
struck down the North Carolina death penalty law on the ground that the
procedure by which the penalty was imposed--death was the mandatory sen-
tence for first degree murder and first degree rape-violated the cruel and un-
usual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.213
The present capital punishment statute enacted in the wake of Woodson
resembles the "guided discretion" statutes of Georgia, Florida and Texas that
survived constitutional scrutiny in the Supreme Court.214 The North Carolina
statute has not itself been approved by the Court, however, and so the consti-
tutionality of the procedure prescribed by this statute is an arguable issue in
any death penalty case.
210. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978).
211. The language of the statute provides: "The sentence of death shall be overturned and a
sentence of life imprisonment imposed in lieu thereof by the Supreme Court.. . ..." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1978) (emphasis supplied). In construing G.S. 15A-2002 the court in
State v. Johnson (Johnson 11) held that the legislature's use of the word "shall" in prescribing
entry of sentence by the trial court upon the jury's recommendation makes the sentencing recom-
mendation binding upon the trial court. 298 N.C. at 371, 259 S.E.2d at 762.
212. 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
213. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
214. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 59
CA PIT4L PUNISHMENT
In State v. Barfield2 15 the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the stat-
ute against a broad constitutional attack. Rather than challenging the particu-
lar aggravating and mitigating circumstances that arose in her case, 216
defendant mounted an assault on the entire statute. Relying on four different
arguments, defendant claimed that the death penalty isper se cruel and unu-
sual punishment; that the statute prescribes an unconstitutional mandatory
death penalty; that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are unconsti-
tutionally vague; and that the Constitution requires that the state prove the
absence of any mitigating circumstances before the death penalty may be im-
posed.2 17 After reviewing the cases in the Supreme Court from Furman
through Woodson,2 18 the North Carolina court rejected each of defendant's
arguments.
The court held that the death penalty is not a cruel and unusual punish-
ment for the crime of first degree murder, agreeing with the Gregg holding
that in such cases the punishment of death is neither purposeless nor dispro-
portionate to the severity of the crime.2 19
Disagreeing with defendant's contention that the new statute failed to cor-
rect the errors of the prior law overruled in Woodson, the court held that the
current law does not prescribe a mandatory death penalty.220 The Woodson
problem of societal rejection of mandatory sentencing and potential jury nulli-
fication are alleviated when the issue of guilt is divorced from the issue of
punishment, said the court.22 1 Furthermore, the statute permits the jury, as
the arbiter of sentence, to consider the particular circumstances both of the
crime and of the defendant. The use of jury discretion, within the bounds
prescribed by the statute; prevents successful attack under Woodson.222
Answering the contention that the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances are unconstitutionally vague, the court conceded that these sentencing
standards posed "difficult" questions to juries.223 Nevertheless, said the court,
these standards "have a common sense core of meaning" and "do not require
the jury to do substantially more than is ordinarily required of a factfinder in
any lawsuit." 224 Defendant's assertion that these standards are unconstitu-
tionally vague and that the statute provides insufficient guidance to apply
them were found "not persuasive. ' 225
Finally, the court rejected defendant's argument that due process requires
the state to prove the absence of any mitigating circumstances before the death
215. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979).
216. Defendant inBa&ield brought forward no assignments of error relating to the submission
of aggravating circumstances at the sentencing hearing. 298 N.C. at 354, 259 S.E.2d at 544.
217. Id at 343, 259 S.E.2d at 537.
218. Id at 343-48, 259 S.E.2d at 537-40.
219. Id at 348-49, 259 S.E.2d at 540-41.
220. Id at 349-52, 259 S.E.2d at 541-43.
221. Id at 350, 259 S.E.2d at 541-42.
222. I d at 351-52, 259 S.E.2d at 542-43.
223. Id at 353, 259 S.E.2d at 543.
224. Id
225. Id at 352, 259 S.E.2d at 543.
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penalty could be imposed. The court's holding on this point is in accord with
the Mullaney-Patterson line of cases relating to the burden of proof in criminal
cases.226 While the burden of negating an essential element of the offense
cannot be placed on a criminal defendant, it is constitutionally permissible to
require the defendant to prove facts in mitigation of sentence.
The disposition of the broad constitutional claims made in Bar6ield makes
it clear that the North Carolina Supreme Court entertains no doubt as to the
constitutionality of the death penalty in general or as prescribed by the North
Carolina Capital Punishment Statute. The court obviously does not intend to
contradict the will of the legislature on an issue of such profound public inter-
est and with such a longstanding history of public acceptance. Thus, it is ap-
parent that capital punishment will continue to be the law of North Carolina
until the legislature repeals the statute or the United States Supreme Court
abrogates the death penalty nationwide.
CONCLUSION
In spite of its approval of the death penalty as a matter of constitutional
law, the North Carolina court has shown a willingness to give meticulous scru-
tiny to every death sentence that comes before it. The court seems not at all
willing to sanction the infliction of death by the state unless the terms of the
statute are scrupulously adhered to and constitutionally applied. The resolu-
tion of future cases, then, will depend largely on the circumstances of both the
crime and the defendant, and the propriety of submitting particular aggravat-
ing or mitigating factors in particular fact situations.
Capital punishment remains the law of North Carolina. While the recent
cases resolve many of the basic questions concerning the imposition of the
death penalty, in this volatile area of the law the questions still by far outnum-
ber the answers.
JOEL M. CRAIG
226. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
See text at notes 158-61 supra.
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